Experimenting with (Conditional) Perfection

Conditional perfection is the phenomenon in which conditionals are strengthened to biconditionals. In some contexts, “If A, B” is understood as if it meant “A if and only if B.” We present and discuss a series of experiments designed to test one of the most promising pragmatic accounts of conditional perfection. This is the idea that conditional perfection is a form of exhaustification—that is a strengthening to an exhaustive reading, triggered by a question that the conditional answers. If a speaker is asked how B comes about, then the answer “If A, B” is interpreted exhaustively to meaning that A is the only way to bring about B. Hence, “A if and only if B.” We uncover evidence that conditional perfection is a form of exhaustification, but not that it is triggered by a relationship to a salient question

Claim Strength and Burden of Proof

In this paper, we report results from experiments in which people read conversational arguments and then judge (a) the convincingness of each claim and (b) the individual speakers\u27 burden of proof. The results showed an anti-primacy effect: People judge the speaker who makes the first claim as having greater burden of proof. This effect persists even when each speaker\u27s claims are rated equally convincing. We also find that people rate claims less convincing when they appear in the first part of an argument than when they appear in isolation

How similar are objects and events?

Semanticists often assume an ontology for natural language that includes not only ordinary objects, but also events, and other sorts of entities. We link this ontology to how speakers represent static and dynamic entities. Specifically, we test how speakers determine whether an entity counts as “atomic” by using count vs. mass (e.g., some gleebs, some gleeb) and distributive vs. non-distributive descriptions (e.g., gleeb every second or so, gleeb around a little). We then seek evidence for atomic representation in a non-linguistic task. Ultimately we suggest that natural language ontology reveals properties of language-independent conceptualization

How do we regard fictional people? How do they regard us?

Readers assume that commonplace properties of the real world also hold in realistic fiction. They believe, for example, that the usual physical laws continue to apply. But controversy exists in theories of fiction about whether real individuals exist in the story’s world. Does Queen Victoria exist in the world of Jane Eyre, even though Victoria is not mentioned in it? The experiments we report here find that when participants are prompted to consider the world of a fictional individual (“Consider the world of Jane Eyre…”), they are willing to say that a real individual (e.g., Queen Victoria) can exist in the same world. But when participants are prompted to consider the world of a real individual, they are less willing to say that a fictional individual can exist in that world. The asymmetry occurs when we ask participants both if a real person is in the character’s world and if the person would appear there. However, the effect is subject to spatial and temporal constraints. When the person and the character share spatial and temporal settings, interchange is more likely to occur. These results shed light on the author’s implicit contract with the reader, which can license the reader to augment a fictional world with features that the author only implicates as part of the work’s background

Combining prototypes: A selective modification model

We propose a model that accounts for how people construct prototypes for composite concepts out of prototypes for simple concepts. The first component of the model is a prototype representation for simple, noun concepts, such as fruit, which specifies: (1) the relevant attributes of the concepts, (2) the possible values of each attribute, (3) the salience of each value, and (4) the diagnosticity of each attribute. The second component of the model specifies procedures for modifying simple prototypes so that they represent new, composite concepts. The procedure for adjectival modification, as when red modifies fruit, consists of selecting the relevant attribute(s) in the noun concept (color), boosting the diagnosticity of that attribute, and increasing the salience of the value named by the adjective (red). The procedure for adverbial modification, as in very red fruit, consists of multiplication-by-o-scalar of the salience of the relevant value (red). The outcome of these procedures is a new prototype representation. The third component of the model is [Tversky, 1977] contrast rule for determining the similarity between a representation for a prototype and one for an instance. The model is shown to be consistent with previous findings about prototypes in general, as well as with specific findings about typicality judgments for adjective-noun conjunctions. Four new experiments provide further detailed support for the model.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/27126/1/0000118.pd